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Abstract 
This research adds to the literature on relationship lending in the small business context 
by discussing the roles of entrepreneurial competence and voluntarily disclosed 
information as determinants of credit access. More specifically, we propose that the 
loan manager’s evaluation of the information voluntarily disclosed by the entrepreneur 
is an important complement to publicly available financial data and soft information 
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collected through observation and third parties in framing the loan manager’s perception 
of the entrepreneur’s competence. Further, we argue that banks charge lower interest 
rates if the loan manager perceives the entrepreneur to be competent. Econometric 
analysis based on 433 bank-firm relationships supports these hypothesised relationships. 
The results imply that entrepreneurs need to communicate their competence effectively 
to loan managers, and that banks should utilise their loan managers’ personal 
evaluations as inputs to lending decisions. 
 
Keywords: Small and Medium Enterprises, Competence, Interest rate, Lending 
Relationship 
 
1. Introduction 
The finance gap experienced by small entrepreneurial firms attracts considerable 
scholarly attention (Ang, 1992; Cassar, 2004; Howorth, 2001; Wingborg and 
Landström, 2000). Prior research argues that the gap emerges because of asymmetry of 
information: lenders struggle to discriminate ‘good’ entrepreneurs (those who will repay 
the loan) from ‘bad’ entrepreneurs (those who will not), due to the limited quantity and 
accuracy of information available (Diamond, 1984). Research suggests that lenders use 
various strategies, such as collateral and covenants, to ensure that the borrower’s 
behaviour meets their expectations (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). However, these strategies 
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carry substantial transaction costs, which can be harmful, especially in the small 
business context. An alternative strategy is to find means of gathering more 
information. Indeed, strategies that provide lenders with usable information have 
important implications because any reduction in the information asymmetry benefits 
everyone except the ‘bad’ entrepreneurs: (1) the ‘good’ entrepreneurs gain easier access 
to finance; (2) the society benefits from firms that stay in business and grow; and (3) 
banks face lower defaults on the credit provided.  
In fact, the major problem lenders face in dealing with small entrepreneurial firms 
is that the financial information that is publicly available on small businesses is opaque 
(Berger et al., 2001; Berger and Frame, 2007; McMahon and Holmes, 1991; Mason and 
Stark, 2004), for several reasons. First, ownership concentration and the desire to 
maintain control over the enterprise affects the way these firms disclose information 
(Ang, 1992; Binks et al., 2006; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). Second, there 
are differences in information disclosure requirements for different forms of finance 
(Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006; Wingborg and Landström, 2000). Third, accounting 
standards and taxation strategies affect the way in which firms disclose financial figures 
(Griffith, 1995). Finally, the public information that is available is typically 
retrospective and thus its usefulness in terms of forecasting the firm’s future potential is 
limited, especially in the case of new growth-oriented ventures.  
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Prior studies suggest that transaction lending (lending based on publicly available 
financial data) does not properly satisfy the financial needs of SMEs and that, in order 
to deal with the information asymmetry lenders face, relationship lending can be an 
effective alternative or addition to it (Berger and Udell, 2006). Relationship lending 
relies on ‘soft’ information, which the literature defines as information that the loan 
manager accesses over and above the official financial figures (Berger and Udell, 2006). 
It is found to be an important complement to the ‘hard’ information derived from 
official financial figures, especially when assessing a firm’s future potential. Such soft 
information accumulates over time and is often measured using the length and strength 
of the relationship between the bank and the client. Interestingly enough, the 
relationship lending literature so far neglects another factor that can reduce the 
information asymmetry: voluntarily disclosed information. In fact, the accumulation of 
soft information is usually conceptualised as occurring over the course of the 
relationship, but it is not assumed that the client actively discloses information. The 
present study argues that, not only hard information and relationship length and 
strength, but also the client’s voluntary disclosure of information, all play a role in the 
lending relationships between banks and SMEs. 
The present research further argues that an important conduit for conveying the 
effects of the different sources of information onto the actual lending decisions is the 
loan manager’s perception of the entrepreneur’s competence. Perceived competence is 
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relevant for lenders since it is an indicator of the venture’s future potential (Baron and 
Markman, 2003; Brown and Zehnder, 2007), or how successful entrepreneurs and their 
firms are likely to be in creating and exploiting business opportunities (Chandler and 
Hanks, 1994). The effects of soft and voluntarily disclosed information in particular are 
likely to be mediated by perceived competence, while hard information affects lending 
decisions more directly due to the official financial figures being direct inputs into 
banks’ computer systems.  
The empirical analysis of a dataset comprising publicly available financial data 
and primary survey data on 433 bank-SME relationships in Northern Italy shows that 
the information voluntarily disclosed by the entrepreneur influences the loan manager’s 
perception of the entrepreneur’s competence over and above the effects of hard 
financial figures and soft information accessed by the loan manager independently of 
the entrepreneur’ willingness to disclose it. In addition, the analysis finds that perceived 
competence affects the interest rate charged by the bank and mediates the impact of 
voluntarily disclosed information on the interest rate. 
This article makes the following contributions. For the entrepreneurship literature, 
this study raises the importance of the loan manager’s personal perception and 
evaluation of the information that the entrepreneur voluntarily discloses – as a 
complement to soft information and hard financial information – in determining the 
former’s perception of the competence of the latter and, consequently, the firm’s access 
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to credit. The main implication for practising entrepreneurs is that they can influence 
how loan managers perceive their competence through their information disclosure 
behaviour and benefit as a result from reduced interest rates. For banks, the main 
implication is that they should delegate more lending authority to local loan managers 
as the key people who interact with entrepreneurs and therefore have access to willingly 
disclosed information and soft information in addition to the publicly available financial 
figures. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
2.1. Entrepreneurial competence and the lending decision 
Competence as a complex phenomenon (Russell, 2001; Wasilczuk, 2000) goes 
beyond one cognitive dimension, trait, knowledge, skill, or personal characteristic. It 
focuses on the ability to successfully meet complex demands in a particular context; it 
includes the mobilisation of knowledge and skills as well as social and behavioural 
components such as attitudes (Mulder, 2006). Competence builds on skills and 
knowledge (Davidsson and Honig, 2003) but it is not attached to specific routines or 
organisations. Instead, competence is an attribute specific to individual actors, 
signalling their ability to meet particular expectations (Grant, 1996) through their 
behaviour (Bird, 1995). In the entrepreneurial context, competence affects the 
likelihood that the entrepreneur will deploy the assets in such a way as to successfully 
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meet the expectations of the firm’s stakeholders and, thus, it is a determinant of future 
performance (Lans et al., 2011; Russell, 2001; Wasilczuk, 2000). 
Indeed, Chandler and Jansen (1992) report a positive link between 
entrepreneurs’ self-assessed competence and firm performance. Chandler and Hanks 
(1994) find that competence moderates the relationship between the quality of the 
business opportunity and subsequent firm performance as well as the link between 
access to resource-based capabilities and firm performance. Baron and Markman (2003) 
discover a positive correlation between entrepreneurs’ social competence and their 
ability to obtain finance and attract key employees, while Holt and Macpherson (2010) 
argue that social competence and an awareness of others’ needs, wishes, ambitions and 
objectives are central to the foundation and potential success of a small firm. Thus, 
competence is a key factor in determining the future performance of the venture (Man et 
al., 2002). 
However, the assessment of an entrepreneur’s competence is dependent on the 
assessor’s subjective perception: for instance, Huck and McEwen (1991) report that 
self-assessed competence of entrepreneurs differs according to their gender. Mulder 
(2006) finds low correlations between entrepreneurs’ self-assessed competence and the 
assessments of their competence by consultants and co-workers. Further, Howorth and 
Moro (2006) show that the loan manager’s perception of the entrepreneur’s ability is a 
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component of the trust relation between these actors and affects the entrepreneur’s 
access to credit.  
 
2.2. Information asymmetry and the assessment of entrepreneurial competence 
2.2.1. An agency theory perspective on the lending decision 
Research on the lending relationship between small firms and banks approaches 
the analysis of the roles of different sources of information from the agency theory point 
of view (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The lender (principal) has to deal with a borrower 
(agent) who has conflicting interests and who has more information about their own 
abilities and motives than the lender has. Because of the need to reduce information 
asymmetry, banks face ex ante costs associated with the need to collect as much 
relevant information as possible (Stein, 2002), while borrowers face ex ante costs 
related to information production and disclosure. 
In fact, small firms typically face difficulties in satisfying banks’ formal 
information requirements (Berger et al., 2001; Kotey, 1999) and because of such 
difficulties they can be held up (Howorth et al., 2003). In addition, banks generate ex 
ante costs by asking for guarantees and collateral from small businesses in order to deal 
with opportunistic behaviour (Binks et al., 2006; Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant, 
2011; Zecchini and Ventura, 2009). Ex post costs can arise because of adjustments to 
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the agreement between the bank and the entrepreneur, necessary because the firm has 
not performed as expected (Coase, 1990).  
Research suggests that loan managers build their evaluations of entrepreneurs’ 
creditworthiness by leveraging the diverse types of information available to them 
(García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2007; Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant, 
2008; Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001; Scellato and Ughetto, 2010). The following 
sections discuss the roles of different information types in more detail.  
2.2.2. Publicly available ‘hard’ information 
Many different cultural, strategic, legal, and relational factors explain why only 
a limited amount of information is included in small firms’ financial reports. Ang 
(1992) points out that small enterprises are characterised, among other things, by capital 
structures comprising a mix of personal and firm wealth. The entrepreneur’s personal 
wealth influences their access to finance and there is evidence of a lack of separation 
between business and personal risk (Ang, 1992; Ang et al., 1995). Indeed, entrepreneurs 
tend to invest their entire wealth in the venture from the very beginning (Avery et al., 
1998). The lack of separation impacts on the transparency of the firm’s accounts: when 
the firm is run as a sole proprietorship, the bank(s) can access the entrepreneur’s 
personal wealth in order to be repaid; when the firm is run as a limited liability 
company, entrepreneurs are often asked to provide personal collateral and personal 
guarantees (Berger et al., 2006). This means that the overall amount of personal wealth 
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invested in the firm also includes the personal wealth used as collateral/guarantee, 
which is not disclosed in any part of the financial report. Reliance on trade credit 
(Howorth, 2001; Summers and Wilson, 2002) and specific financing tools such as 
leasing and factoring (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006) introduces an extra layer of 
complexity to the firm’s financial structure. Furthermore, entrepreneurial firms rely on 
personal loans and bootstrap finance, such as loans from friends and relatives, personal 
credit card loans, and personal bank loans (Wingborg and Landström, 2000). These 
sources of finance are only partially and opaquely disclosed in the financial report. 
Moreover, entrepreneurs can enjoy a range of additional pecuniary and non-
pecuniary benefits from their business, which are hard to spot even with a careful 
examination of the financial report: Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) estimate 
that entrepreneurs’ pecuniary benefits can be up to 20% of their investment in the firm; 
Hamilton (2000) explains the limited entrepreneurial earnings with, among other things, 
the fact that entrepreneurs can use cash from the firm to pay for their personal expenses 
and use the firm’s assets for personal purposes. Official financial figures are also 
affected by accounting standards and tax regulations (Keuschnigg and Bo, 2004): firms 
implement strategies to reduce their taxes, which affects the figures disclosed in 
financial reports (Griffith, 1995).  
The arguments presented so far illustrate ways in which hard information can be 
biased, precluding the loan manager from properly evaluating the entrepreneur’s 
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competence and creditworthiness. Nevertheless, previous research suggests that the 
analysis of official information provides some useful insights into a firm’s current and 
prospective performance. Mramor and Valentincic (2003) suggest that financial ratios 
and lagged liquidity indicators have predictive relevance for spotting the firms that will 
not fail. Pompe and Bilderbeek (2005) find that all the ratios they examine have some 
predictive relevance, particularly for more mature businesses. Further, Beaver et al. 
(2005) find that the predictive capabilities of ratios are unaffected by changes in 
accounting standards, suggesting that ratios are robust tools. Recently, Bottazzi et al. 
(2011) have found that economic variables such as growth prospects, productivity and 
size play a role in determining the probability of default, over and above the indicators 
of financial performance. However, a study of US pharmacies by Thomas and Evanson 
(1987) provides evidence to the contrary. 
In conclusion, previous empirical evidence does not unanimously advocate or 
discredit the use of official financial figures for estimating the firm’s current or 
prospective performance and the entrepreneur’s competence. Banks often rely on such 
information in combination with the collateral provided by the firm and/or by the 
entrepreneur (Berger and Udell, 2006). Nevertheless, theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence suggest that loan managers need additional information from other 
sources on which to base their assessments of entrepreneurs’ competence and the 
subsequent lending decisions.  
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2.2.3. Soft information  
An alternative to taking lending decisions based on hard financial data and the 
collateral provided (transaction lending) is relationship lending (Berger and Udell, 
2006), which relies on a variety of private information gained over the course of a long-
term relationship (Berger et al., 2001; Berger and Udell, 1995; Hernández-Cánovas and 
Koëter-Kant, 2008; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Berger and 
Udell (2006) argue that in relationship lending the collection of information on a client 
is a continuous process that goes beyond the information available in official 
documents. This additional information remains confidential to the provider of funds, 
who uses it as a basis for taking further lending decisions. Brown and Zehnder (2007) 
suggest that relationship lending improves banks’ ability to evaluate their business 
clients’ level of risk and increases the repayment rate of the loans provided. 
Empirical research has demonstrated the value of relationship lending and the 
different factors that influence its role, in the US and various European countries alike. 
In their seminal work set in the US context, Berger and Udell (1995) find that the length 
of the relationship negatively affects the interest rate charged to the client. Similarly, 
Angelini et al. (1998), by looking at Italian SMEs, observe that not only the length of 
the relationship but also the age of the firm affect the bank’s decision over whether to 
lend and what interest rate to charge. Harhoff and Körting (1998) and Elsas (2005) 
examine lending relationships in Germany and find that the closeness of the relationship 
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affects credit access. In another study of German banks, Grunert et al. (2005) 
demonstrate that both hard and soft information affect credit decisions. Further, 
Hernandez-Canovas and Martınez-Solano (2010) find the level of regional 
concentration in the banking sector to be relevant in Spain. Other factors found to exert 
a significant effect in the context of relationship lending and SMEs in diverse European 
countries include trust (Howorth and Moro, 2012), the number of banks that are 
financing a firm (Ongena and Smith, 2000), the physical closeness of the bank to the 
borrower (Alessandrini et al., 2009; Neuberger et al., 2008), quality of management and 
market positioning (Grunert et al., 2005), and the socio-economic context (Lehmann et 
al., 2004).  
Common empirical indicators of soft information, such as the length of the 
relationship or the frequency of loan manager visits and the intensity with which they 
examine the borrower’s performance, provide the lender with access to soft information, 
regardless of whether or not the borrower is happy to disclose the information. 
Similarly, a bank can receive information about a client’s competence in running their 
business, as well as current and prospective performance, from third parties, such as the 
client’s suppliers and customers (who, in a situation of high bank concentration, may 
themselves be the bank’s customers). This information flow may happen without the 
client knowing about it. All in all, the way soft information has been analysed so far 
does not account for the role of voluntary disclosure in the acquisition of relevant 
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information: either soft information refers to information collected outside the 
relationship (such as reputation) or it refers to informal information that the loan 
manager accesses in repeated interactions with the firm but independently from the 
entrepreneur’s willingness to disclose it. However, the entrepreneur holds additional 
information relevant for the loan manager’s decision making which the loan manager 
can access only if the entrepreneur chooses to disclose it.  
2.2.4. Voluntarily disclosed information 
We define voluntarily disclosed information as information about the firm’s 
current and prospective performance that is valuable for the loan manager’s decision 
making but that can only be accessed if the entrepreneur chooses to disclose it. This 
information is neither available in public databases (hard information) nor can it be 
accessed via third parties or through observation (soft information). Examples of 
voluntarily disclosed information include the entrepreneur’s opinions about new market 
opportunities, potential new threats and market developments, current results of R&D 
projects, detailed financial information about production costs, and even what kind of 
permissible adjustments have been made to the official financial figures in order to 
minimise the tax impact on the firm. Thus, the very strength of voluntarily disclosed 
information is that it can cover a broad spectrum of topics that may be relevant for the 
loan manager’s decision making. However, the loan manager might be completely 
unaware of it, if they rely solely on traditional hard and soft information. 
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Given its highly specific nature, voluntary disclosure of information requires a 
certain level of trust, for the entrepreneur needs to know that the information they 
provide will not be used against their interests. A recent review of the entrepreneurship-
related trust literature by Welter (2012) suggests that a high level of trust supports 
sensitive information disclosure, since this kind of communication only takes place in 
high-trust situations (Doz, 1996; Squire et al., 2009).  
Research shows that in trusting situations both entrepreneurs and loan managers 
can benefit from improved credit access at a lower cost (Howorth and Moro, 2012). 
Therefore, when the required level of trust is available, voluntary information disclosure 
can be a rational strategy for the entrepreneur to improve the lending relationship. Here, 
Howorth and Moro (2006) show that good entrepreneurs tend to be proud of their 
performance and are therefore happy to disclose information about their past success. 
Good entrepreneurs who are more proactive in disclosing information to loan managers 
provide rich additional information that helps the loan managers to evaluate the 
entrepreneurs’ competences. 
The downside of voluntary information disclosure is that a bad entrepreneur may 
be motivated to disclose false information in order to provide a better impression to the 
loan manager. The chance of the entrepreneur manipulating the loan manager is closely 
related to the level of trust within the relationship (McEvily et al., 2003). However, in 
the specific context of the relationship between the entrepreneur and the loan manager it 
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is quite hard for the entrepreneur to ‘window dress’ bad performance successfully: the 
loan manager can spot distorted information by cross-analysing it with information 
collected from other sources (Berger et al., 2001). As soon as a loan manager spots 
dishonest behaviour on the part of the entrepreneur, they will cease to rely on the 
voluntarily disclosed information and will take extra care in examining any other data 
available about the entrepreneur and their business. Thus, in the long run, it is not just 
the disclosing behaviour that matters but the fact that the loan manager perceives the 
entrepreneur to have a proactive approach to disclosing information, perceives them to 
provide the right amount of additional information and perceives such information to be 
complete and accurate.  
2.3. Hypotheses 
So far, this article has argued that three different sources of information play a 
role in forming a loan manager’s perception of their entrepreneur client’s competence, 
which, as an indicator of the firm’s future performance and creditworthiness, serves as a 
conduit for these effects to influence the firm’s access to credit. This section presents 
five hypotheses for subsequent empirical examination and provides a summary of the 
arguments leading up to each hypothesis.  
A principal argument in this research, following the relationship lending 
literature, is that the publicly available hard information in the financial report does not 
provide a comprehensive picture of the entrepreneur’s competence. Nevertheless, banks 
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traditionally use these figures as inputs in their lending decisions. Against this backdrop, 
the present study proposes that the information that a loan manager derives from their 
small business client’s financial reports affects their perception of the client’s 
competence. The study thus offers the following hypothesis:  
 
H1. Publicly available hard financial information influences the loan manager’s 
perception of the entrepreneur’s competence. 
 
In line with previous research on relationship lending, this research further 
argues that soft information, accessed by the loan manager over the course of the 
customer relationship, is an important complement to publicly available hard data in 
loan managers’ assessments of entrepreneurs’ competence to manage and develop their 
businesses. This argument leads to the second hypothesis: 
 
H2. Soft information affects the loan manager’s perception of the entrepreneur’s 
competence. 
 
Moreover, this research suggests that there is a positive relationship between the 
loan manager’s perception of the entrepreneur’s active information disclosure behaviour 
(that is, the overall quality of the information voluntarily disclosed) and their perception 
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of the entrepreneur’s competence: the greater the amount of information disclosed, the 
better the quality of this information, the more timely it is, and the more complete it is 
(Elsas and Krahnen, 1998; Gustavsson and Wänström, 2009), the easier it is for the loan 
manager to discriminate between good and bad entrepreneurs. Therefore: 
 
H3. The loan manager’s perception of the quantity, quality, completeness, and 
timeliness of an entrepreneur’s voluntary information disclosure exerts a 
positive effect on the loan manager’s perception of the entrepreneur’s 
competence. 
 
Finally, previous studies suggest that both hard and soft information support the 
credit access of SMEs and reduce the interest rates charged (Berger and Udell, 2006; 
García-Teruel and Martínez-Solano, 2007; Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant, 2008; 
Hernández-Cánovas and Koëter-Kant, 2011; Hernandez-Canovas and Martınez-Solano, 
2010). In addition, perceived competence is found to help the loan manager to evaluate 
the risk incurred in financing a business, aiding the selection of good customers and 
increasing the repayment rate of the loans provided (Brown and Zehnder, 2007). Using 
the interest rate as an indicator of the credit conditions applied by the bank, this study 
expects a high level of perceived competence to benefit an entrepreneur by giving them 
access to lower interest rates since financing them is perceived as less unsafe. We 
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further argue that perceived competence mediates the effects of hard, soft and 
voluntarily disclosed information on the interest rate. Against this backdrop, the present 
study develops two additional hypotheses: 
 
H4: The loan manager’s perception of the entrepreneur’s competence exerts a 
negative effect on the interest rate charged to the firm.  
 
H5: The loan manager’s perception of the entrepreneur’s competence mediates 
the effects of the different sources of information on the interest rate charged to 
the firm. 
 
Figure 1 provides a graphical illustration of the hypothesised relationships. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
3.1 Data 
The research team collected the data for this study in South Tyrol and Friuli 
Venezia Giulia, in the widely studied and economically successful north east of Italy. 
The Italian banking system comprises large and small banks. While the large banks 
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mainly rely on transaction lending, the small banks tend to apply relationship lending. 
The nine banks that participated in the data collection belong to the latter group. A 
random sample of small and medium-sized firms (defined as per European Commission 
(2003), that is businesses with a turnover smaller than 50 million Euros, with fewer than 
250 employees and with less than 43 million Euros in total on the balance sheet, 
excluding agricultural firms) was selected from the clientele of each bank. The selection 
process comprised the following steps: first, the banks generated a list of all customers 
fulfilling the aforementioned criteria for being categorised as SMEs. Next, the banks 
sorted the customers either alphabetically or based on a unique customer identification 
number. Finally, they picked every nth customer to be included in the sample. Since both 
alphabetical order and sorting based on the customer identification number are 
independent from the characteristics of the client and the relationship, the selection 
process generated a random sample of SMEs. 
The banks asked their loan managers to fill in the questionnaire, evaluating the 
competence of the entrepreneurs they assist and their level of satisfaction with various 
aspects of the information disclosed by each entrepreneur. In addition, the central loan 
office of each bank provided financial information on the firms from the bank’s 
information system. These information systems contain data from the public database 
maintained by the Chambers of Commerce which in turn collects data from firms’ 
annual financial reports as well as from the Bank of Italy database (Centrale Rischi). In 
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the latter, the credit provided by banks to each of their customers is recorded and 
updated monthly. The final sample comprises 433 bank-firm relationships. 
 
3.2 Measures 
Interest rate. The dependent variable, the interest rate, is measured as the 
interest rate specifically charged by the bank to the customer on the line of credit, that 
is, credit that can be claimed back by the bank at very short notice and that is rolled over 
on an annual basis. The data for this measure were derived from the banks’ information 
systems. We decided to use this particular measure as the loan price since loan 
managers have some room for manoeuvre regarding the interest rate charged on the line 
of credit and this rate can be renegotiated easily, whereas the interest rate charged on 
long-term debt is usually fixed at the beginning of the loan period. Thus, the interest 
rate on the line of credit reflects the loan manager’s current evaluation of the client.  
Perceived competence. The survey instrument administered to the loan 
managers measured their perception of the entrepreneur’s competence with a four-item 
scale based on Thompson et al. (1996), Mayer and Davies (1999), and Chandler and 
Jansen (1992). For example, one of the items was: ‘The entrepreneur knows very well 
the market in which she/he operates’. Appendix A provides the full list of scale items 
with the sources. The loan managers were asked to evaluate the individual items on a 5-
Page 22 of 53 
point Likert scale from ‘totally disagree’ (1) to ‘totally agree’ (5). The Cronbach’s alpha 
value for the four items is .82. 
Information disclosure. Four items, measured on a 5-point Likert scale from 
‘very poor’ (1) to ‘very good’ (5), capture the loan manager’s satisfaction with the 
quantity, quality, completeness, and timeliness of the information disclosed by the 
entrepreneur. One of the items is: ‘Are you satisfied with the amount of information 
received?’ Appendix A displays the full list of items. The Cronbach’s alpha value for 
the four items is .89. 
Hard information. Two financial indices serve as indicators of hard financial 
information. The first index is the log of the firm’s short-term bank debt (defined as 
debt with a residual life of less than one year or that can be claimed back by the bank at 
short notice) divided by the firm’s annual turnover (measured in tens of thousands of 
Euros). This is a ratio that was found in the Pompe and Bilderbeek (2005) study to be a 
predictor of financial distress. It explains the impact of bank finance on annual turnover. 
More competent entrepreneurs tend to limit the ratio since, the more a firm relies on 
bank finance to run its operations, the less room the entrepreneur has for manoeuvre, 
because external stakeholders (the lenders) can constrain the entrepreneur’s decisions 
either by refusing additional funding or claiming back the funds provided. Hence, this 
study expects to observe a negative relationship between this ratio and the loan 
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manager’s perception of the entrepreneur’s competence. In addition, because firms with 
a lower ratio are perceived as less risky, they should be granted lower interest rates. 
The second index capturing hard information is the share of short-term debt in 
the firm’s total bank debt. The ratio parallels the short-term debt/total assets of Mramor 
and Valentincic (2003) and Pompe and Bilderbeek (2005), the long-term liabilities/total 
assets of Beaver (1966), and the total liabilities to net worth of Thomas and Evanson 
(1987). The ratio used here, by avoiding total assets and the net worth figure, is not 
affected by accounting strategies and indicates the robustness of the firm’s financial 
structure: A bank can ask a firm to pay back its short-term debt at very short notice. 
Thus, competent entrepreneurs tend to leverage more long-term debt in order to reduce 
their dependence on short-term bank debt and, thus, give themselves more room for 
manoeuvre in exploiting business opportunities. Therefore, this analysis expects to see a 
negative relationship between this ratio and the loan manager’s perception of the 
entrepreneur’s competence. Furthermore, since a higher proportion of long-term debt 
implies a more solid and less risky debt structure (the firm has less risk of being asked 
to repay the debt at short notice), firms with a low ratio are perceived as less financially 
risky and thus should be charged a lower interest rate. 
Soft information. The empirical analysis includes two variables that capture soft 
information through the intensity of the lending relationship, which is how soft 
information has traditionally been measured in the relationship lending literature. An 
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intense relationship, defined as one in which the partners meet frequently over a long 
period of time, increases the amount of information the loan managers can access, 
largely independent of the entrepreneur’s willingness to disclose this information. The 
first variable is the number of meetings between the loan manager and the entrepreneur: 
the more meetings, the more intense the relationship, and the easier it is for the loan 
manager to access information irrespective of the entrepreneur’s willingness to disclose 
it. The second variable is the (log of the) length of the relationship (Berger and Udell, 
1995; Petersen and Rajan, 1994): the longer the relationship, the greater is the loan 
manager’s access to historical private information. In addition to being measures of soft 
information in their own right, another role these two variables play in this study is to 
ensure that the information disclosure index indeed carries the effect of voluntary 
information disclosure, and not simply information that has accumulated over the 
course of the relationship through observation or third parties. 
Control variables. The empirical model specification includes two control 
variables. The first one, in line with the work by Bottazzi et al. (2011), who suggest an 
important role for economic variables in credit evaluation, is the log of the annual 
turnover of the firm. This measure is a very good proxy for the size of the firm (Bottazzi 
et al., 2011). Larger firms are more solid and are the result of previous business growth 
and development. Hence, it is fair to assume that the owners of larger firms are, ceteris 
paribus, perceived as more competent than their counterparts in smaller firms. In 
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addition, larger firms have more negotiating power. Due to their higher perceived 
competence and negotiating power, firms generating a higher annual turnover can 
command a lower interest rate. The second control measure is a full set of bank 
dummies identifying the bank in the lending relationship. This measure controls for 
potential variations in bank-specific (and regional) lending policies and practices.  
Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations of the model variables as 
well as their intercorrelations.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.3 Analysis strategy 
This analysis opts for structural equation modelling (SEM) for the hypothesis 
testing, for three principal reasons. First, SEM is a robust technique for examining 
mediation hypotheses, as it allows a detailed examination of indirect effects. Second, 
since two of the research constructs are factors, modelling them as latent variables in 
SEM allows the analysis to account for measurement error. Third, SEM enables the 
analysis to include a method factor (Podsakoff et al., 2003) for a rigorous control of 
common method variance, which is a potential problem with these data because one of 
the main explanatory variables (information disclosure) and a dependent variable 
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(perceived competence) were measured with the same research instrument at the same 
time using the same informant.  
The analysis strategy consists of four steps. The first step ensures the 
dimensionality, reliability, and validity of the measurement models for the two latent 
variables (Anderson and Gerbing, 1988). The second step estimates the structural model 
using maximum likelihood estimation. The third step controls for the accuracy of the 
initial model estimates by including a single unmeasured latent method factor to control 
for common method variance, as Podsakoff et al. (2003) recommend. This procedure 
controls for systematic variance among the items associated with the two latent 
variables in the model. Having established the relationships of interest in the model and 
adjusted them for method variance, the final step of the analysis is to include the control 
variables in the model specification in order to investigate the extent to which the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the banks, captured through the bank dummies, and the 
size of the clients, measured as the log of the annual turnover, may influence the 
substantive interpretation of the model results. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Measurement model assessment 
The first step examines the two factors that are modelled as latent variables 
(competence and information disclosure). The exploratory principal components 
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analysis with direct Oblimin rotation results in two factors with Eigenvalues over 1 that 
explain 71% of the variance in the data. The rotated solution shows that all items that 
belong to the information disclosure scale clearly load on the first factor (loadings .82–
.89), and all four items measuring the entrepreneur’s perceived competence load on the 
second factor (loadings .77–.85). Thus, all items are retained for further analysis. 
The next step assesses the reliability and validity of the model constructs by 
means of confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). All indicators load significantly (0.1% 
level) on their intended constructs, with parameter estimates ranging from .64 to .87 
(Appendix A displays the loadings for each item). Even though the chi-squared test of 
model fit is significant (χ218df = 38.55; p = .003), the other conventional fit indices, 
which are not as sensitive to sample size, suggest a very good fit between the model and 
the data: the comparative fit index (CFI) is .99, which exceeds the recommended 
minimum of .95; the root mean square error (RMSEA) is .05, which is below the 
recommended maximum of .06; the standardised root mean squared residual (SRMR) is 
.02, which is below the recommended maximum of .08 (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
We also compute the average variance extracted (AVE) for both constructs. With 
AVE scores of .51 (competence) and .68 (information disclosure), both constructs 
exceed the threshold of .50: the indicators explain more of each construct than other, 
external influences (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). The AVE also serve as a measure of 
discriminant validity: as indicated in Table 1, the correlation between information 
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disclosure and competence is moderately high at .53 but the square roots of the two 
AVE values (.72 and .82) are higher than .53, indicating that the present measurement 
model has good discriminant validity (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
4.2 Structural model assessment 
The first step of the structural model assessment estimates the base model 
including only the hypothesised relationships (Model 1 in Table 2). Even though the 
chi-squared test of model fit is significant, all of the other fit indices meet the 
conventional thresholds for maximum-likelihood estimation (Hu and Bentler, 1999). 
Therefore, it is safe to interpret the path coefficients.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The estimates relating to the first endogenous variable, competence, show that 
information disclosure is by far the most significant predictor, exerting a positive effect 
on the loan manager’s perception of the entrepreneur’s competence. One of the 
indicators for hard information, the short-term debt / turnover ratio, is also significant 
and the coefficient has a negative sign as expected. Finally, both traditional measures of 
soft information show significant effects on perceived competence. While the effect of 
the length of the relationship is positive as proposed, interestingly, the coefficient of 
frequency of meetings is negative. Possibly, when the loan manager is dissatisfied with 
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the firm’s performance and the entrepreneur’s competence, there is more need for 
formal meetings. By and large, the estimates of Model 1 support H1-H3: all three types 
of information have a significant influence on the loan manager’s perception of the 
entrepreneur’s competence.  
Concerning the coefficients pertaining to the second endogenous variable, the 
interest rate, the estimates demonstrate that perceived competence exerts a significant 
negative effect on the interest rate charged to the client. This result clearly supports H4. 
The final hypothesis (H5) suggested that competence also mediates the effects of the 
three information sources on the interest rate. To test this hypothesis, we examined the 
indirect effects of the variables capturing the various information sources.  
The indirect effect of information disclosure on the interest rate via perceived 
competence is negative and significant (standardised coefficient: -.10, p < .001). A 
comparison of the indirect effect and the total effect of this variable shows that 56% of 
the effect of information disclosure is mediated by perceived competence. The other 
two variables that have significant indirect effects are the short-term debt / turnover 
ratio and the length of the relationship. The former has a small positive indirect effect 
(.016, p < .05), which is contrary to the expected negative effect, but it should be noted 
that only 12% of the effect of this variable is mediated. In other words, the main effect 
of this variable on the interest rate is a direct and negative one (Model 1, Table 2). The 
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length of the relationship shows the expected negative indirect effect on the interest rate 
(-.02, p < .05) and 26% of the effect of this variable is mediated by competence.  
In summary, the estimations provide partial support for H5. Competence mediates 
the effects of soft information, especially voluntary disclosure, on the interest rate 
charged by the bank, while the effect of hard information on the interest rate is 
predominantly direct. This is not a surprising finding. Hard information is commonly a 
direct input in lending decisions, while the information voluntarily provided by the 
entrepreneur to the loan manager is not part of the formal decision-making process. 
Therefore, it is logical that the different pieces of private information about the client 
flow into the price of the loan via the loan manager’s perception of how well the 
entrepreneur can do their job.   
The next two steps in the model estimation process introduce control mechanisms 
with the aim of ensuring that the previous interpretations are robust. The first robustness 
check addresses the effect of common method variance. In order to deal with the model 
identification problem, common when there is a single unmeasured latent method factor 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003), the analysis sets one of the parameters in each set of items 
loading on the method factor (perceived competence and information disclosure) to be 
equal. As Model 2 in Table 2 shows, controlling for any systematic variance among the 
items that constitute the factors ‘competence’ and ‘information disclosure’ changes the 
estimates, albeit only modestly. The effect of information disclosure on competence is 
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still positive and significant, as is the effect of the length of the relationship. The short-
term debt / turnover ratio only exerts a direct effect on the interest rate, which is in line 
with the Model 1 estimations that showed that only a marginal share of this variable’s 
influence is mediated by perceived competence.   
The second robustness check adds the control variables to the model specification 
in order to establish whether they influence the substantive interpretation of the 
hypothesised relationships. The new estimates, accounting for the effects of the bank 
dummies and the firm’s annual turnover, show almost equivalent hypothesised 
relationships to Model 1, the only difference being that the two traditional measures of 
soft information (frequency of meetings and length of relationship) now also have direct 
and significant effects on the interest rate. The mediation results remain virtually 
identical to those of Model 1.  
In conclusion, while there is some variation in the results of the different model 
specifications, this variation is relatively marginal: some variables (e.g., frequency of 
meetings) become significant at low levels in certain models but not in others. However, 
four effects appear to be robust across all model specifications.  
First, the short-term debt / turnover ratio, an indicator of hard information, exerts 
a direct negative effect on the interest rate. While some model specifications suggest 
that this variable also has a significant effect on competence and that competence 
partially mediates its effect on the interest rate, the scope of this mediation (7-12%) is 
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so small that it seems more prudent to conclude that the effect of this variable on the 
interest rate is direct. Therefore, this result supports neither H1 nor H5 unambiguously.  
Second, the length of the relationship has a consistently positive and significant 
direct effect on perceived competence and a negative indirect effect on the interest rate 
via competence. This finding lends support to H2 and H5.  
Third, information disclosure has a positive and significant direct effect on 
perceived competence and a negative and significant indirect effect on the interest rate 
via perceived competence. This finding supports H3 and H5.  
The fourth effect that is robust across all model specifications is that perceived 
competence exerts a consistently significant and negative effect on the interest rate, thus 
supporting H4.   
In terms of H5, two of the four robust findings support this hypothesis while the 
third robust finding is equivocal. However, the findings do support the interpretation 
that perceived competence mediates the effects of soft information on the interest rate 
charged by the bank. Moreover, the mediation effect appears to be particularly strong in 
the case of voluntarily disclosed information.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The empirical results assign a significant role to voluntarily disclosed information 
in forming the loan manager’s perception of the entrepreneur’s competence, as a 
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complement to data derived from official financial reports and soft information 
collected through observation and third parties. Besides highlighting the role of 
voluntarily disclosed information, which is of benefit to the relationship lending 
literature in the SME context, the results of this study also have important implications 
for agency theory, which underlies much of the literature on bank-firm relationships. 
These are discussed next. 
Conventionally, agency theory focuses on how to reduce the risk of opportunism 
in the presence of information asymmetry by developing legal tools (detailed contracts) 
or monetary tools (managers’ remuneration) in order to align the behaviour of the agent 
with that expected by the principal (Fama, 1980; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). These 
mechanisms cannot completely reconcile the agent’s and the principal’s objectives and 
do not come without a price: they stimulate the entrepreneur’s opinion that the loan 
manager is not supportive and cannot be trusted. This may reduce the entrepreneur’s 
willingness to disclose information, which in turn reinforces the loan manager’s 
perception of receiving insufficient information, stimulating a non-cooperative game 
(Axelrod, 1981). Consequently, in the relationship between entrepreneur and loan 
manager, traditional coordination mechanisms tend to increase agency problems rather 
than reduce them. 
The present research findings suggest that, in lending relationships, loan managers 
have an alternative. They may engage in measures that foster disclosure (Wathne and 
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Heide, 2000): by nurturing voluntary information disclosure, they increase their 
knowledge of the entrepreneur’s competence, which reduces information asymmetry. 
Previous literature on cooperation points at reciprocal relationships as a potential 
solution (Axelrod, 1981; Fink and Kessler, 2010). Thus, when entrepreneurs disclose 
information and loan managers reciprocate by granting more flexible banking 
relationships (less formal intrusiveness or easier access to credit), the loan managers are 
providing the entrepreneurs with incentives to disclose additional information. 
Similarly, by responding positively to the incentive, the entrepreneur signals an absence 
of opportunism and thus provides the bank with an incentive to grant more favourable 
lending conditions. In such a game, with an indefinite number of anticipated moves, 
both the entrepreneur and the loan manager are better off after each round of the game if 
they cooperate instead of cheat (Axelrod, 1981). 
However, relying on perceived competence and voluntarily disclosed information 
also has a dark side, as the loan manager can misinterpret both the disclosing behaviour 
and the actual information. In the worst case, the entrepreneur can take advantage of a 
close relationship to cheat the loan manager by disclosing incorrect or misleading 
information. In fact, the chance of the entrepreneur manipulating the loan manager is 
closely related to the level of trust within the relationship (McEvily et al., 2003) as trust 
has been shown to be linked to reduced levels of scepticism towards the interaction 
partner (Rennie et al., 2010; Thorgren and Wincent, 2011), reduced monitoring 
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(Williams, 2001), rigidity in failing to adapt one’s evaluation of a partner in response to 
changing circumstances (Barnett and Carroll, 1995), and a failure to realise that the 
effect of the relationship has become negative (Miller and Friesen, 1980; Patzelt and 
Shepherd, 2008). Researchers stress that a high level of trust may lead to an even higher 
risk of fraud (Shapiro, 1987) and a systematic bias in the assessment of an exchange 
partner (Kahneman et al., 1982). All in all, over-reliance on voluntarily disclosed 
information can make the loan manager blind to obvious difficulties in a firm, as they 
may too easily give the benefit of the doubt (Kautonen et al., 2010) or simply react too 
late in the case of misconduct (Thorgren and Wincent, 2011). Therefore, it is important 
to note that it is not trust between the loan manager and the entrepreneur, but the 
voluntary information disclosure itself that reduces the threat of opportunistic behaviour 
in the lending relationship: the relationship between the entrepreneur and the loan 
manager needs sufficient closeness and trust to facilitate the voluntary disclosure of 
information but it also needs sufficient distance to avoid the negative side of 
socialisation (Gargiulo and Ertug, 2006; Wicks et al., 1999). 
In summary, the present research suggests that publicly available hard financial 
data, soft information collected through observation and third parties, and voluntarily 
disclosed information each play a role in loan managers’ perceptions of entrepreneurs’ 
competence. In particular, entrepreneurs’ information disclosure behaviour increases 
their perceived competence, reduces the perceived threat of opportunism in the eyes of 
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the loan managers and, by increasing their knowledge about the entrepreneurs, improves 
loan managers’ ability to discriminate between good and bad customers. This shows up 
in lower interest rates for entrepreneurs whom the loan managers perceive as having 
voluntarily provided high-quality information. Thus, banks should give their loan 
managers more leeway to tap the potential of information that is voluntarily disclosed 
through the social relationship (Stein, 2002). In addition, information disclosure may 
stimulate loan managers to reciprocate with cooperative behaviour: they may grant 
entrepreneurs easier access to credit. 
The present research expands agency theory by pointing out the importance of 
social interaction and personal relationships in the formation of perceptions that reduce 
opportunistic behaviour, suggesting that the disclosing behaviour of the agent can 
benefit the principal and that such behaviour can be supported by the principal’s 
provision of incentives to benefit the agent. 
In interpreting the presented findings, the reader must keep in mind certain 
limitations. The empirical study is based on northeast Italy, an area characterised by 
Latin and German cultures. The disclosing behaviour and the reciprocation of 
cooperative behaviour may be affected by cultural aspects (Fink and Harms, 2012). In 
addition, the impact of disclosing behaviour on the lending relationship due to increased 
perceived competence may be reduced in financial systems that rely mainly on 
transaction lending (such as the Anglo-Saxon one). Thus, the findings need to be tested 
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by replicating the study in different contexts (Hubbard et al., 1998). The data used in the 
analysis are cross-sectional: the present research does not take into consideration the 
evolution of perceived competence as the result of a set of interactions between the 
entrepreneurs and loan managers. This topic is an attractive area for future research. 
Notwithstanding the limitations attached to the characteristics of the dataset and 
the context, the study indicates that disclosure by the entrepreneur is an important 
determinant of the perception of competence in the loan manager’s mind, and thus may 
influence lending relationships more than has hitherto been acknowledged. 
 
References 
Alessandrini P, Presibitero AF and Zazzaro A. (2009) Banks, Distances and Firms' 
Financing Constraints. Review of Finance 13: 261-307. 
Anderson JC and Gerbing DW. (1988) Structural Equation Modelling in Practice: A 
Review and Recommended Two-step Approach. Psychological Bulletin 103: 
411-423. 
Ang JS. (1992) On the Theory of Finance for Privately Held Firms. Journal of Small 
Business Finance 1: 185-203. 
Ang JS, Wuh Lin J and Tyler F. (1995) Evidence of the Lack of Separation Between 
Business and Personal Risk Among Small Business. Journal of Small Business 
Finance 4: 197-210. 
Page 38 of 53 
Angelini P, Di Salvo R and Ferri G. (1998) Availability and cost of credit for small 
businesses: Customer relationships and credit cooperatives. Journal of Banking 
& Finance 22: 925-954. 
Avery RB, Bostic RW and Samolyk KA. (1998) The role of personal wealth in small 
business Finance. Journal of Banking & Finance 22: 1019-1061. 
Axelrod R. (1981) The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists. The American 
Political Science Review 75: 306-318. 
Barnett WP and Carroll GR. (1995) Modeling Internal Organizational Change. Annual 
Reviews in Sociology 21: 217-236. 
Baron RA and Markman GD. (2003) Beyond social capital: the role of entrepreneurs’ 
social competence in their financial success. Journal of Business Venturing 18: 
41–60. 
Beaver WH. (1966) Financial Ratios as Predictors of Failure. Empirical Research in 
Accounting: Selected Studies, 1966. Journal of Accounting Research 
Supplement 71-111. 
Beaver WH, McNichols MF and Rhie Jung-Wu. (2005) Have Financial Statements 
Become Less Informative? Evidence from the Ability of Financial Ratios to 
Predict Bankruptcy. Review of Accounting Studies 10: 93-122. 
Beck T and Demirguc-Kunt A. (2006) Small and medium-size enterprises: Access to 
finance as a growth constraint. Journal of Banking & Finance 30: 2931–2943. 
Page 39 of 53 
Berger AN, Espinosa-Vega M, Frame SW, et al. (2006) Why Do Borrowers Pledge 
Collateral? New Empirical Evidence on the Role of Asymmetric Information, . 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Peper Series 2006-29. 
Berger AN and Frame SW. (2007) Small Business Credit Scoring and Credit 
Availability Journal of Small Business Management 45: 5–22. 
Berger AN, Klapper LF and Udell GF. (2001) The Ability of Banks to Lend to 
Informationally Opaque Small Business. Journal of Banking & Finance 25: 
2127-2167. 
Berger AN and Udell GF. (1995) Relationship Lending and the Lines of Credit in Small 
Firm Finance. Journal of Business 68: 351-381. 
Berger AN and Udell GF. (2006) A more complete conceptual framework for SME 
finance. Journal of Banking & Finance 30: 2945–2966. 
Binks M, Ennew C and Mowlah A. (2006) The relationship between private businesses 
and their banks. International Journal of Bank Marketing 24: 346-355. 
Bird B. (1995) Toward a Theory of Entrepreneurial Competency In: Katz JA and 
Brockhaus RH (eds) Advances in Entrepreneurship, Firm Emergence and 
Growth Second ed. Greenwich: Jai Press Inc., 51-72. 
Bottazzi G, Grazzi M, Secchi A, et al. (2011) Financial and economic determinants of 
firm default. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 21: 373–406. 
Page 40 of 53 
Brown M and Zehnder C. (2007) Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan 
Repayment. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39: 1883-1918. 
Cassar G. (2004) The financing of business start-ups. Journal of Business Venturing 19: 
261–283. 
Chandler GN and Hanks SH. (1994) Founder Competence, the Environment, and 
Venture Performance. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 18: 77-89. 
Chandler GN and Jansen E. (1992) The Founder’s Self-Assessed Competence and 
Venture Performance. . Journal of Business Venturing 7: 223-236. 
Coase RH. (1990) Firm, the Market and the Law, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Davidsson P and Honig B. (2003) The role of social and human capital among nascent 
entrepreneurs Journal of Business Venturing 18: 301–331. 
Diamond DW. (1984) Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring. Review of 
Economic Studies 51: 393-414. 
Doz YL. (1996) The Evolution of Cooperation in Strategic Alliances: Initial Conditions 
or Learning Process? Strategic Management Journal 17: 55-83. 
Elsas R. (2005) Empirical determinants of relationship lending. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 14: 32–57. 
Elsas R and Krahnen JP. (1998) Is relationship lending special? Evidence from credit 
data in Germany. Journal of Banking & Finance 22. 
Page 41 of 53 
European Commission. (2003) Recommendation of 6 May 2003 concerning the 
definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises. In: Commission E (ed) 
2003/361/EC. Brussels: European Union. 
Fama E. (1980) Agency Problems and Theory of the Firms. Journal of Political 
Economy 88: 288-306. 
Fink M and Harms R. (2012) Contextualizing the relationship between self-commitment 
and performance: Environmental and behavioural uncertainty in (cross-boarder) 
alliances of SMEs. . Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 24: 1-19. 
Fink M and Kessler A. (2010) Cooperation, Trust and Performance – Empirical Results 
from Three Countries. British Journal of Management 21: 469-483. 
Fornell C and Larcker DF. (1981) Evaluating Structural Equation Models with 
Unobservable Variables and Measurement Error. Journal of Marketing Research 
18: 39-50. 
García-Teruel PJ and Martínez-Solano P. (2007) Short-term Debt in Spanish SMEs. 
International Small Business Journal 25: 579-602. 
Gargiulo M and Ertug G. (2006) The Dark Side of Trust. In: Bachman R and Zaheer A 
(eds) Handbook of Trust Research. Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar, 165-186. 
Grant RM. (1996) Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic 
Management Journal 17: 109–122. 
Page 42 of 53 
Griffith I. (1995) Creative Accounting: How to Make Your Profits What You Want 
Them to be, London: Routledge. 
Grunert J, Norden L and Weber M. (2005) The role of non-financial factors in internal 
credit ratings. Journal of Banking & Finance 29: 509–531. 
Gustavsson M and Wänström C. (2009) Assessing information quality in manufacturing 
planning and control processes. International Journal of Quality and Reliability 
Management 26: 325-340. 
Hamilton BH. (2000) Does Entrepreneurship Pay? An Empirical Analysis of the 
Returns to Self-Employment, . Journal of Political Economy 108: 604-631. 
Harhoff D and Körting T. (1998) Lending relationships in Germany - Empirical 
evidence from survey data. Journal of Banking & Finance 22: 1317-1353. 
Hernández-Cánovas G and Koëter-Kant J. (2008) Debt Maturity and Relationship 
Lending: An Analysis of European SMEs. International Small Business Journal 
26: 595-617. 
Hernández-Cánovas G and Koëter-Kant J. (2011) SME financing in Europe: Cross-
country determinants of bank loan maturity. International Small Business 
Journal: 489-507. 
Hernandez-Canovas G and Martınez-Solano P. (2010) Relationship lending and SME 
financing in the continental European bank-based system. Small Business 
Economics 34: 465–482. 
Page 43 of 53 
Holt R and Macpherson A. (2010) Sensemaking, rhetoric and the socially competent 
entrepreneur. International Small Business Journal 28: 20–42. 
Howorth C. (2001) Small Firms' Demand for Finance: A Research Note. International 
Small Business Journal 19-86: 78. 
Howorth C and Moro A. (2006) Trust within Entrepreneur Bank Relationships: Insights 
from Italy. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 30: 495-517. 
Howorth C and Moro A. (2012) Trustworthiness and the Cost of Credit: An Empirical 
Study of SMEs and Small Banks in Italy. Small Business Economics 39: 161-
177. 
Howorth C, Peel MJ and Wilson N. (2003) An Examination of the Factors Associated 
with Bank Switching in the U.K. Small Firm Sector. Small Business Economics 
20: 305-317. 
Hu L and Bentler PM. (1999) Cutoff Criteria for Fit Indexes in Covariance Structure 
Analysis: Conventional Criteria versus New Alternatives. Structural Equation 
Modelling: A Multidisciplinary Journal 6: 1–55. 
Hubbard R, Vetter DE and Little EL. (1998) Replication in Strategic Management: 
Scientific Testing for Validity, Generalizability, and Usefulness. Strategic 
Management Journal 19: 243-254. 
Page 44 of 53 
Huck JF and McEwen T. (1991) Competences needed for Small Business Success: 
Perceptions of Jamaican Entrepreneurs. . Journal of Small Business 
Management October 90-93. 
Jensen MC and Meckling WH. (1976) Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 
305-360. 
Kahneman D, Slovic P and Tversky A. (1982) Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Kautonen T, Zolin R, Kuckertz A, et al. (2010) Ties that blind? How strong ties affect 
small business owner-managers’ perceived trustworthiness of their advisors. 
Entrepreneurship and Regional Development 22: 189–209. 
Keuschnigg C and Bo NS. (2004) Progressive Taxation, Moral Hazard, and 
Entrepreneurship. Journal of Public Economic Theory 6: 471-490. 
Kotey B. (1999) Debt Financing and Factors Internal to the Business. International 
Small Business Journal 17: 11-29. 
Lans T, Verstegen J and Mulder M. (2011) Analysing, pursuing and networking: 
Towards a validated three-factor framework for entrepreneurial competence 
from a small firm perspective. International Small Business Journal 29: 695–
713. 
Page 45 of 53 
Lehmann E and Neuberger D. (2001) Do lending relationships matter? Evidence from 
bank survey data in Germany. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 
45: 339–359. 
Lehmann E, Neuberger D and Räthke S. (2004) Lending to Small and Medium-Sized 
Firms: Is There an East-West Gap in Germany? Small Business Economics 23: 
23–39. 
Man TWY, Lau T and Chan KF. (2002) The Competitiveness of Small and Medium 
Enterprises – A Conceptualization with Focus on Entrepreneurial Competences. 
Journal of Business Venturing 17: 123-142. 
Mason C and Stark M. (2004) What do Investors Look for in a Business Plan? A 
Comparison of the Investment Criteria of Bankers,Venture Capitalists and 
Business Angels. International Small Business Journal 22: 227-248. 
Mayer RC and Davies JA. (1999) The Effect of the Performance Appraisal System on 
Trust for Management: A Field Quasi-Experiment. Journal of Applied 
Psychology 84: 123-136. 
McEvily B, Perrone V and Zaheer A. (2003) Trust as an Organizing Principle. 
Organization Science 14: 91-105. 
McMahon RGP and Holmes S. (1991) Small Business Financial Management Practices 
in North America: A Literature Review. . Journal of Small Business 
Management April: 19-29. 
Page 46 of 53 
Miller D and Friesen PH. (1980) Momentum and Revolution in Organizational 
Adaptation. Academy of Management Journal 23: 591–614. 
Moskowitz TJ and Vissing-Jørgensen A. (2002) The Returns to Entrepreneurial 
Investment: A Private Equity Premium Puzzle? . The American Economic 
Review 92: 745-778. 
Mramor D and Valentincic A. (2003) Forecasting the liquidity of very small private 
companies. Journal of Business Venturing 18: 745-771. 
Mulder M. (2006) EU-level Competence Development Projects in Agri-Food-
Environment: The Involvement of Sectoral Social Partners. Journal of European 
Industrial Training 30: 80-99. 
Neuberger D, Pedergnana M and Räthke-Döppner S. (2008) Concentration of Banking 
Relationships in Switzerland: The Result of Firm Structure or Banking Market 
Structure? Journal of Financial Services Research 33: 101–126. 
Ongena S and Smith DC. (2000) What Determines the Number of Bank Relationships? 
Cross-Country Evidence. Journal of Financial Intermediation 9: 26–56. 
Patzelt H and Shepherd DA. (2008) The Decision to Persist with Underperforming 
Alliances: The Role of Trust and Control. Journal of management studies 45: 
1217-1243. 
Petersen MA and Rajan RG. (1994) The Benefits of Lending Relationships: Evidence 
from Small Business Data, . Journal of Finance 49: 3-37. 
Page 47 of 53 
Petersen MA and Rajan RG. (1995) The Effect of Credit Market Competition on 
Lending Relationship. Quarterly Journal of Economics May: 407-443. 
Podsakoff PM, MacKenzie SB, Lee JY, et al. (2003) Common Method Biases in 
Behavioural Research: A Critical Review of the Literature and Recommended 
Remedies. Journal of Applied Psychology 88: 879–903. 
Pompe PPM and Bilderbeek J. (2005) The prediction of bankruptcy of small- and 
medium-sized industrial firms. Journal of Business Venturing 20: 847–868. 
Rennie M, Kopp L and Lemon W. (2010) Exploring Trust and the Auditor-Client 
Relation-ship: Factors Influencing the Auditor’s Trust of a Client 
Representative. Auditing 29: 279-293. 
Russell CJ. (2001) A Longitudinal Study of Top-Level Executive Performance. Journal 
of Applied Psychology 86: 560-573. 
Scellato G and Ughetto E. (2010) The Basel II Reform and the Provision of Finance for 
R&D Activities: An Analysis of a Sample of Italian Companies International 
Small Business Journal 28: 65-89. 
Shapiro SP. (1987) The Social Control of Impersonal Trust. American Journal of 
Sociology 93: 623-658. 
Squire B, Cousins PD and Brown S. (2009) Cooperation and Knowledge Transfer 
within Buyer–Supplier Relationships: The Moderating Properties of Trust, 
Page 48 of 53 
Relationship Duration and Supplier Performance. British Journal of 
Management 20: 461–477. 
Stein JC. (2002) Information Production and Capital Allocation: Decentralised versus 
Hierarchical Firms. . Journal of Finance 57: 1891-1921. 
Stiglitz JE and Weiss A. (1981) Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect 
Information. American Economic Review 71: 393-410. 
Summers B and Wilson N. (2002) An Empirical Investigation of Trade Credit Demand. 
International Journal of the Economics of Business 9: 257-270. 
Thomas JI and Evanson RV. (1987) An Emprical Investigation of Association Between 
Financial Ratio use and Small Business Success. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting 14: 555-571. 
Thompson JE, Stuart R and Lindsay PR. (1996) The Competences of Top Team 
Members. A framework for Successful Performance. Journal of Managerial 
Psychology 11: 48-66. 
Thorgren S and Wincent J. (2011) Interorganizational Trust: Origins, Dysfunctions and 
Regulation of Rigidities. British Journal of Management 22: 21–41. 
Wasilczuk J. (2000) Advantageous Competence of Owner/Managers to Grow the Firm 
in Poland: Empirical Evidence. Journal of Small Business Management April: 
88-94. 
Page 49 of 53 
Wathne KH and Heide JB. (2000) Opportunism in Interfirm Relationship: Forms, 
Outcomes, and Solutions. Journal of Marketing 64: 36-51. 
Welter F. (2012) All you need is trust? A critical review of the trust and 
entrepreneurship literature. International Small Business Journal 30: 193-212. 
Wicks AC, Berman SL and Jones TM. (1999) The Structure of Optimal Trust: Moral 
and Strategic Implication. Academy of Management Review 24: 99-116. 
Williams M. (2001) In Whom We Trust: Group Membership as an Affective Context 
for Trust Development. Academy of Management Review 26: 377-396. 
Wingborg J and Landström H. (2000) Financial Bootstrapping in Small Business: 
Examining Small Business Managers’ Resource Acquisition Behaviour. Journal 
of Business Venturing 16: 235-254. 
Zecchini S and Ventura M. (2009) The Impact of Public Guarantees on Credit to SMEs. 
Small Business Economics 32: 191-206. 
 
 
Page 50 of 53 
Appendix A Psychometric scale items and item-level descriptive statistics 
Competence Mean SD Loading Source 
The entrepreneur knows very well the market in which she/he operates 4.10 .71 .64 Chandler and Jansen (1992); 
Thompson, Stuart, and 
Lindsay (1996) 
The entrepreneur is good at selecting the required resources 3.69 .80 .74 Mayer and Davies (1999); 
Thompson, Stuart, and 
Lindsay (1996) 
The entrepreneur is good at managing resources 3.79 .78 .82 Chandler and Jansen (1992); 
Mayer and Davies (1999) 
The entrepreneur is good at understanding the market evolution 3.80 .78 .65 Chandler and Jansen (1992); 
Thompson, Stuart, and 
Lindsay (1996) 
Information disclosure     
Are you satisfied with the amount of information received? 3.55 .80 .81  
Are you satisfied with the quality of the information received? 3.67 .79 .87  
Are you satisfied with the completeness of the information received? 3.65 .82 .84  
Are you satisfied with the timeliness of the information received? 3.45 .90 .77  
Note: N=433. The loading is the standardised parameter estimate from the confirmatory factor analysis.   
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Figure 1 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
   Correlations 
Variable Mean SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Interest rate 5.37 1.44 1       
2. Perceived competence 3.84 .62 -.16 1      
3. Information disclosure 3.58 .72 -.06 .53 1     
4. Short-term debt / turnover1 6.42 50.93 -.11 -.02 .11 1    
5. Short-term debt / total debt .71 .32 -.00 .03 .01 .02 1   
6. Frequency of meetings 2.97 1.23 -.03 .04 .20 -.03 -.15 1  
7. Length of relationship (log) 2.04 .86 -.07 .11 .05 .04 -.09 -.04 1 
8. Turnover (log) 13.76 1.30 -.26 .05 .05 -.21 .17 -.05 .07 
Notes: N=433. Pearson correlations. Coefficients greater than .1 are significant at the 5% level. 1 This measure has been divided by 1000 for 
efficiency of presentation.   
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Table 2 Results of the structural equation model estimation 
 
 Model 1: 
Base model 
Model 2: 
Method factor 
Model 3: 
Controls1 
 Competence Interest rate Competence Interest rate Competence Interest rate 
Perceived competence  -.20** 
(.07) 
 -.27** 
(.09) 
 -.19** 
(.07) 
Information disclosure .63*** 
(.04) 
.11 
(.07) 
.39** 
(.13) 
.09 
(.07) 
.63*** 
(.04) 
.10 
(.07) 
Short-term debt / turnover -.13** 
(.04) 
-.13** 
(.05) 
.03 
(.07) 
-.10* 
(.05) 
-.12** 
(.05) 
-.19*** 
(.04) 
Short-term debt / total debt .06 
(.05) 
-.01 
(.05) 
-.06 
(.07) 
-.03 
(.05) 
.06 
(.05) 
.01 
(.04) 
Frequency of meetings -.08* 
(.05) 
-.05 
(.05) 
-.04 
(.07) 
-.04 
(.05) 
-.11* 
(.05) 
-.10* 
(.05) 
Length of relationship (log) .11** 
(.04) 
-.05 
(.05) 
.11* 
(.06) 
-.04 
(.05) 
.11* 
(.05) 
.10* 
(.05) 
Turnover (log)     .05 
(.05) 
-.31*** 
(.05) 
χ2 86.99 (48 df) 46.60 (35 df) 299.70 (102 df) 
CFI / RMSEA / SRMR .979 / .043 / .027 .994 / .028 / .019 .909 / .067 / .034 
Notes: N=433. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (one-tailed test). Standardised coefficients (standard errors).  
1 In addition to log turnover, this model specification contains a full set of bank dummies (7 dummies for 8 banks) whose coefficients 
are not reported.  
 
 
 
